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Abstract
The main objective of this paper is to investigate actual practices of technology transfer in a recent
automobile assembly project in Thailand and investigations are done at both intra-firm level - from the
Japanese automaker (J-firm) to its affiliate (T-firm) - and inter-firm level - from J-firm to T-firm's sup-
pliers.  Necessary information was collected through field surveys, including factory visits and inter-
views with J-firm, T-firm and suppliers, and a questionnaire survey on suppliers.  Major findings can be
summarized as follows: 1) technology transfer was not limited only to intra-firm but also inter-firm lev-
els, 2) at both levels, technology transfer process required substantial resource allocation, especially
human resources exchanges and training, 3) formal training in Japan and on-the-job training (OJT) at T-
firm were main strategies to develop local workers' skill at intra-firm level, 4) at inter-firm level, techni-
cal assistance by J-firm normally took the form of advice rather than direct support, 5) direct support
would be provided only to suppliers that revealed possibility of delay, aiming to establish systematic
management practices and to instruct specific technical aspects necessary for successfully preparation.
These findings suggest that foreign direct investment not only promotes technology transfer at intra-firm
level but inter-firm level as well.
1. Introduction
Inter-firm linkages between large-foreign and local-based-small firms in manufacturing sector have
received widely recognition from scholars that these linkages have significant impacts to technological
development of ancillary industries of many host countries (Mead 1984, Hill 1985, Blomstrom and
Kokko 1999).  Such linkages have been recognized as important sources of growth in small- and medi-
um-scale enterprises (SMEs) as a mechanism for promoting technology transfer through subcontracting
relationship or inter-firm relationship (Wong 1991, Capannelli 1997).  Inducements from substantial
strict standard requirement by foreign firms in terms of quality, timely delivery, and cost down policy,
drive local firms to improve their technical capability.  However, the customer also has to impart some
specific knowledge to its suppliers, hence, through this interaction, local suppliers are exposure to new
knowledge and can have an opportunity to improve their capability accordingly.
Despite this growing recognition of the potential for accelerating technological development through
buyer-supplier relationships, there have been surprisingly little empirical case studies of the actual situa-
tion and practice of how this relation can lead to such improvements.  It is true that a vast body of study
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on technology transfer has been offered, but many of them focused only at intra-firm level, e.g.  Teece
(1977), Yamashita (1991), Ramachandran (1993), Urata and Kawai (1998).  Lack of empirical research
in respect of inter-firm technology transfer is one of major motivations of this paper.
In Thailand, as a recipient country of foreign direct investment (FDI), the government has exerted
enormous efforts to attract FDI.  Automobile industry is one of the target industries and has developed
significantly due to government intervention (Doner 1991, Poapongsakorn and Fuller 1998,
Abdulsomad 1999).  Industry-wide has not developed only in the final assembly of automobiles, but
also in supporting industries.1 However, doubts still reside with people.  They are skeptical and suspi-
cious about the willingness to transfer technology by foreign firms.  For instance, Ichiro Sato has com-
mented Thai people as follow: "they are always anxious to have modern technologies transferred to their
country, but they neglect to appreciate what technology transfer concretely and specifically comprises",2
implying that Thai people may misunderstand the actual meaning and practice of technology transfer.
They seem to view the topic as a once-and-for-all affair, but in fact, technology transfer is not and never
characterizes in that way.  It is rather a continuous process of knowledge accumulation and it normally
takes time (Rosenberg 1982, Yamashita 1991).
Therefore, to improve understanding of Thai people, and hopefully those in other recipient countries,
this study aims to contribute to the literature by doing research on a recent project of automobile assem-
bly in Thailand at both intra- and inter-firm levels.  Open-ended interviews and questionnaires were
used in order to understand that to which aspects and by what methods were employed by a multination-
al firm in transferring manufacturing capability to an overseas project.  Findings support that technology
transfer is a complicated and time-consuming process.  In addition, the assembler has had rendered tech-
nical assistance to suppliers, and inter-firm relationship with assemblers is considered as an important
source of technological improvement by all suppliers.
The organization of this paper is as follows.  Section 2 briefly describes the field research carried out
in Thailand and characteristics of the sample firms.  Section 3 presents research findings on a case of
intra- and inter-firm technology transfer practices.  Discussions on strategies of skill formation at both
levels are based upon information disclosed mainly by and interviews with J-firm's staff.  Section 4 con-
cludes.
2. Analytical Framework and Source of Data
This study relies mainly on primary information.  I conducted two field surveys, from March to May
and from September to October 2000.  After objectives were set to tracing technology transfer process
in a recent automobile assembly project, called T-firm project,3 the first step of this research entailed vis-
iting factories and interviewing with staff of the selected firm, i.e. headquarter plant (J-firm) in Japan
and the affiliate (T-firm) in Thailand.  I visited T-firm and was able to interview with many staff of sev-
eral departments.  Information received from this survey clearly revealed that, in particular to this case,
J-firm once decided to invest in Thailand, it had to accomplish transferring manufacturing capability not
only to its affiliate (intra-firm level), but also to suppliers (inter-firm level).
This firm is appropriate for study because of two major reasons: firstly, among all new automobile
assembly projects, this firm has the largest production capacity, and secondly, it set an ambitious goal to
export Thai made products at the very early stage.  With considerably large capacity and a goal to
export, it would be discernible that considerable efforts would be allocated to develop production capa-
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bility of local people and local suppliers.  Hence, studying this firm would be able to offer a more appre-
ciable explanation about actual practices of technology transfer by a foreign firm.
Based on findings from the first round survey, I construct a general structure of relationships between
J-firm and the T-firm project (see Figure 1).  It was discovered that J-firm had to create various relation-
ships not only at intra-firm level, the relationship with its overseas affiliate (assembling firm, shown by
the upper block arrow), and its part maker affiliate (if any), but also with all suppliers in Thailand.
Relationships with suppliers are prevalent because J-firm wanted to ensure that all suppliers could
achieve the required quality level and timely delivery schedule of the project.  Expected benefits accru-
ing to J-firm from this attempt are in forms of higher quality of parts or cost reduction, rather than mon-
etary returns (like the intra-firm or arms' length case).  However, information exchange taking place dur-
ing this process might result in technological improvement in the recipient sides if they could adopt
some of valuable information from their customers (Lall 1980, Wong 1991, Capannelli 1997).  Given
this possibility, this channel is called inter-firm technology transfer, which has been argued that contri-
butions to host countries in term of technological development from this channel may be higher than
other means (Blomstrom and Kokko 1999).
In addition, there were many suppliers, both Japanese and non-Japanese, that participated in the
heuristic product development stage taking place in Japan.  Some of them may already have a plant or
joint venture agreement with a firm in Thailand, while some that received sufficient volume order may
decide to set up a new facility.  In either case, if they were approved to be a supplier for this overseas
project, they would be responsible for building up manufacturing capability of firms in that host coun-
try.  This is the main reason for the prevailing of this intra-firm linkage, represented by the lower block
arrow of Figure 1.4 However, this study is not directly concerned with this channel but gives more
emphasis only on investigating two major parts, to the first, the main route of technology transfer that
the assembler has created with its overseas affiliate, and to the second, with its suppliers.  It is expected
that by so doing this study can shed some light on a concealment aspect of contribution of FDI to host
countries particularly in term of technology transfer.
From the first survey, I observed that J-firm had provided technical assistance to some suppliers in
Thailand.  Thus, the second round survey was conducted to extract more comprehensible information
from the recipient side.  I interviewed with T-firm staff again to get more precise information regarding
intra-firm skill formation practices,5 and requested for the supplier list.  There are about 100 suppliers,
consisting of 85 percent Japanese firms,6 10 percent independent Thai firms, and 5 percent non-Japanese
firms.  To avoid a sampling biased and to get overall picture how these firms accomplished preparation
and were able to supply parts for T-firm, questionnaires were sent to all suppliers in September 2000.
The questionnaire was required production, sales, and/or personnel managers to fill in.  Main questions
were designed to understand general information, characteristics of their relationship with customers
and their technological capability status.  Questions include how they acquired production technology,
sources of technological improvement, what kinds of technical linkages J-firm had provided, and link-
ages with other customers.
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2.1 Characteristics of Respondents
From the total 100 sets of questionnaires sent to T-firm's suppliers, I got replied from 26 companies,
making the response rate to be 26 percent.  Following J-firm's classification, the sample firms comprise
19 Japanese (including wholly owned Japanese and Japanese joint venture) firms, four Thai firms, and
three non-Japanese foreign firms.  However, since almost all non-Thai suppliers are Japanese firms,7 I
will classify three ownership types, which are 1) 'Foreign' for firms with foreign ownership more than
80 percent, 2) 'Joint venture' for firms with foreign ownership between 20 and 79 percent, and 3) 'Thai'
firms for otherwise.  Characteristics of T-firm suppliers that replied the questionnaire are shown in
Table 1.  Among these, I could interview with managers (purchasing, sales, factory and production man-
agers) of four suppliers
As shown in Table 1, ten firms (out of 26 firms) just established their production plant in Thailand in
1990s.  Considered in terms of employment and sales volume, the majority of firms in my study are
large firms.  Almost all of them employed more than 200 workers and about half of them had sales vol-
ume higher than 500 million baht (in 1999 figure).  Regarding export figure, only three firms currently
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Figure 1 An Analytical Framework of Intra- and Inter-firm Technology Transfer
         In Japan In Thailand
Note: 
refers to intra-firm technology transfer
refers to inter-firm technology transfer
refers to buyer-supplier relationship 
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Japanese Auto
Assembler
(J-firm)
Part makers
Part
makers
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have no export, while the rests are exporting different percentages of their production.  From the
returned questionnaires, some of them just started export in 1998, representing adaptation of their policy
to attenuate the downturn of the domestic market.  In addition, concerning types of parts and/or services
that these firms are supplying to T-firm, it appears to cover a wide range of products and technological
requirement.  Not only did it include system parts or marketed products, such as fuel tanks, exhaust sys-
tem, oil pumps, water pumps, radiators, audio equipment, accessories, carpets, but also those assembly
and/or sub-assembly and discrete treatment, such as transmission assembly, machining of engine gears,
casting of engine parts, stamping parts, plastic injection parts.  Given these varieties, it is expected that
this study would be able to provide general information of inter-firm technical linkages created under
the relationship between T-firm and its suppliers.
Table 1 Characteristics of Respondents
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Total
(26 firms)
Thai firms
(4 firms)
Joint venture firms
(10 firms)
Foreign firms
(12 firms)Type of firms
Establishment
71331960s
321－1970s
61231980s
7－341990 - 1995
3－121996 onwards
Employment
2－11Less than 100
3－21100 - 199
10127200 - 499
31－2500 - 999
6231More than 1000
2－2－N.A.
Sales (in 1999)
1－－1Sales less than 50 mB.
1－－150-99.9 mB.
10136100-499.9 mB.
4121500-999.9 mB.
41121000-3000 mB.
4121more than 3000 mB.
2－2－N.A.
Percentage of export
3－－30%
143470.1 - 10 %
2－2－10.1 - 20 %
0－－－20.1 - 50 %
2－11More than 50%
5131N.A.
2641012Total   
Source: Survey by the author, during September and October 2000
Note: N.A. = Data not available
2.2 Existence of Inter-firm Technical Linkages
The second-round survey's results reveal the existence of inter-firm technical linkages created by J-
firm.  Results indicate that only some of the sample firms had received some assistance from J-firm dur-
ing the time prior to the launch of mass production for export, December 1998.  Note that, there was a
team, called 'supplier technical assistance or STA team responsible for creating such inter-firm linkages
with suppliers, and the questionnaire was conducted to investigate this activity.  Questions were asked
all firms to report that during the concerning time period, 1997 - 1999, which types of technical support
they received from J-firm.  Answers can be classified into three types which are: 1) "received direct sup-
port", which refers to the case that suppliers report to have some Japanese STA staff working for a cer-
tain period of time at their plant during the period concerned; 2) "received only indirect support" or "get-
ting only technical advice", referring to the situation that respondents answered to have received some
forms of advice from STA staff; and, 3) "received nothing" is straightforward, referring to the situation
that suppliers considered they did not receive anything from J-firm.  As shown in Table 2, from 26
firms, only 18 firms reported to have received some assistance, either direct or indirect forms.
Interestingly, among 18 firms, four firms explicitly stated that they have got direct assistance from J-
firm during the period concerned, while the rest, eight firms, reported that they did not receive any assis-
tance from J-firm (see Table 2 below).
Table 2 Number of Respondents Receiving Technical Assistance from J-firm
According to interviews with STA staff, it was found that a real and explicit function of STA team
was to support T-firm by monitoring all locally based suppliers to ship all ordered parts on time.  In
practice, STA staff had scheduled to follow up the progress of the preparation that suppliers had accom-
plished, by visiting each company from time to time, usually once a month.  In many cases, they did
only regularly 'company visits' and communication with suppliers to ensure that every thing was on
track.  Some suppliers that had only communication with STA staff might realize they were not receiv-
ing direct assistance but only indirect one.  Indirect technical linkages include advice about quality con-
trol, maintenance, design drawing to make die or tooling, advice about project management, and lending
equipment.8 While those firms that could finish preparation by themselves and STA staff only did visit
and check the progress, they indicated received nothing.  Only four suppliers were found to have
received direct assistance, i.e., a certain period of stay by STA staff.
For those 18 firms that reported to have received either direct and/or indirect assistance, Table 3
shows that all of them obtained advice about quality control practice and 12 of them reported to receive
advice about project management practice.  Nine suppliers got advice how to make and design drawings
for dies and/or tolling necessary for producing parts for T-firm.  Only few firms reported that their cus-
tomers lent machine or equipment.  These results in particular suggest that the J-firm's preferred forms
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(Number of firms)
TotalThai firmsJoint ventureForeign firmsReceived byDegree of assistance
4112Received technical assistance from STA team
14176Received only technical advice
8224Not at all
2641012Total
Source: Survey by the author, during September and October 2000
of technical cooperation that was mainly on information sharing.
Table 3 Technical Assistance Respondents Received from Automobile Customers
After acquiring these results, I then reconfirmed with J-firm about STA activity and resources allocat-
ed for this purpose.  This point will be discussed in details in the next section.  However, it should note
here that results from interview with J-firm staff and a set of disclosed documents indicate that STA
staff had given substantial efforts to some suppliers.  From information disclosed by J-firm, it was
reported that there were two suppliers that had received largest amount of resources (about 80 percent)
spent by STA staff, in term of person-months.  However, in this paper, I attempt to explain the real prac-
tice of inter-firm technology transfer created by J-firm by relying on interview with and information dis-
closed by STA staff, see section 3.2.3.
3. Research Findings
Before proceeding to present research findings, it would be better to describe the objective of T-firm
project in order to understand its initial objectives and its current situation, which would reflect how
successful this project is.  T-firm project is a project of pickup truck assembly established in the mid of
1995.  A mission set initially was to "build and deliver world class quality vehicles and vehicle compo-
nents in an efficient and timely manner to meet… customer's needs world wide" within the first year of
operation.  To achieve this goal, three priority tasks that J-firm had to accomplish before the launch of
mass production of T-firm include, 1) to recruit and develop manufacturing skill of new employees, 2)
to search for good suppliers that were already located in Thailand, and then 3) to keep close relationship
with all suppliers in order to ensure that they could meet all deadlines scheduled for the T-firm produc-
tion plan.
This project had quite limited time span given its ambitious goals.  It was planned to run mass pro-
duction in May 1998 and to export in December of the same year.  From the beginning, there were only
three and a half years to start production for export.  As planned, the production for local market com-
menced in May 1998 with only 398 units and it cumulatively increased to 3,912 units in December
1998, while the production for export was totally 1,848 units at the end of 1998.9 Until the end of 1999,
T-firm could export totally 43,928 units and sold domestically 15,380 units.  At present, it was reported
that T-firm aims to export about 70% of total annual production capacity of 90,000 units.  Hence, it
seems clear how success this project is and why this firm is interesting to do research.
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(Number of firms)
TotalThai firmsJoint Venture firmsForeign firmsReceived byTypes of technical assistance
182881. Quality control practice
42202. Maintenance
92343. Design drawing to make die or tooling
122374. Advice about project management practice
31025. Lending machine or equipment
18288Total number of firms
Source: Survey by the author, during September and October 2000
Note: This table excludes eight firms that reported to receive nothing
In following, this paper studies skill formation at two major levels (i.e., intra- and inter-firm levels)
that J-firm had to take part in building up manufacturing skills.  To make discussion more appreciate, as
mentioned, I scope my study on a specific time frame, from the establishment of the project in 1995 to
December 1998 when export began.  This time frame also applies to the case of inter-firm technical
assistance.  Regarding resources allocated for T-firm project, this study focuses on duration of overseas
training received by Thai staff and performed by Japanese staff.10 Each activity will be separately dis-
cussed.  First, I will present intra-firm practices, and next, move to inter-firm ones.  In each part, I try to
generalize the practice of skill formation process at both levels.  Discussions were based on results of
interview and questionnaire survey.
3.1 Intra-firm Technology Transfer Practice
Efforts to build up manufacturing capabilities of T-firm firstly started in August 1995, when the first
group of Japanese staff was delegated to take care of the project.11 The training plan for local employees
was complete early February 1996.  The plan was to promote and build up skills of local workers in all
classes necessary for the efficient mass production.  According to documents disclosed by J-firm, train-
ing practices for T-firm employees were carried out in the following manners.  Japanese staff were dele-
gated to prepare training courses for Thai staff coming to receive training in Japan.  Not only being
trainers, but in many cases they were also assumed a superior position to their trainees.  After training in
Japan completed, they together with Thai trainees went back to T-firm to prepare for launching mass
production.  Until the end of period concerned, December 1998, totally 83 Japanese staff had been train-
ing local staff in Japan and working at T-firm in Thailand.12 Training courses consisted of three major
aspects, which were production, quality assurance and production control.  Resources expended by
Japanese staff for this purpose, were in total 2,136 person-months (see Table 4).
Table 4 Total Time Japanese Experts Train T-firm Employees
In the part of Thai staff trained in Japan, 187 core members, which were the first group of recruited
staff, including production managers, assistant production managers, engineers, supervisors (or fore-
men), leaders, and technicians (including operators and staff), were scheduled to receive training at the
headquarter plant.  These staff were sent to Japan from time to time in accordance with the schedule set
by the J-firm's master training plan.  These members were expected as inexperienced labor forces, pre-
sumably due to specific manufacturing characteristics of J-firm.  Hence, training these staff had been the
most important key to guarantee a successful launching.  In total, these staff had received training in
Japan 1,549 person-months, on average 8.28 months per person, see Table 5.  However, managers,
assistant managers, engineers, and supervisors, who would not involve in direct operation, had received
longer training duration than those responsible for direct production, indicating how crucial J-firm con-
sidered in building up these people skills.
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Total 
(person-months)At T-firm
Training at HQ plant
in Japan
Workplace
Type of technical assistance
1217674543Production
659460199Quality assurance
26018674Production control
21361320816Total
Source: Calculated from Information of J-firm
Table 5 Total Time Thai Trainees Trained in Japan: Classified by Positions
Generally, when thinking of a transfer of a production process to an overseas facility, one may envis-
age only simple assembly or operational skills, which may be misleading.  At least, as shown above,
results of T-firm project suggest that in order to be efficient in production of automobiles various skills
must be promptly promoted.  What kinds of skill have been formed up can be seen in Figure 2.  Before
these workers were sent to Japan, they had been appointed to take care of ten different types of technical
aspects.  However, from total person-months of training, it seems that J-firm gave more emphasis on six
technical aspects, which are press shop, quality assurance, maintenance, body shop, paint shop, and final
assembly shop.  All of these are the main functions for automobile assembly.  It was observed that staff
in charge of maintenance and quality assurance received on average longest training in Japan.  These
capabilities are very critical in determining the smoothness of operation thereafter.
Figure 2 Thai Staff Trained in Japan: Classified by Workplaces
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AverageTime (person-months)No. of staffPosition
10.5848Production managers
8.5688Assist. production managers
9.9730931Engineers
8.3429235Foremen
7.314620Leaders
7.6565085Technicians, operators, staff
8.281549187Total
Source: Calculate from Information of J-firm
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3.1.2 J-firm training strategies 
Presenting only how many resources expended for T-firm project in forming up local employee skills
may not be appreciate without discussing how J-firm successfully accomplished this task.  It was found
that at the very early stage the most important strategy to impart manufacturing skills was to create
"multipliers." A "multiplier" is a staff in any production department that was trained and evaluated to be
capable of training other staff in that area of works.  Probably it was because of a very limited time span
for the project, a more promising way was to produce as many capable staff as possible from the begin-
ning.  Specifically, training target stipulated by J-firm has three levels as follow: 
Level 1: be able to carry out the basic operation in accordance with a trainer's instruction; 
Level 2: be able to carry out the production operation, being a trainer for the on-site training and
being a trial member for the machines in accordance to a trainer's instruction; and 
Level 3: be able to carry out production operation, kaizen (continuous improvement) and training
newly hired employees.
Regarding definitions given above, the skill of employees would be accumulated from level 1, 2, and
3.  In other words, a higher level attained by a trainee indicates the higher skill level and capability of
the trainee.  In order to achieve this goal, J-firm consider that training would not be success if language
barriers were not reduced.  With a paucity of language difficulty, all core members were assigned to
study Japanese language about six weeks.  Interview results with these members proved the significance
of this course as it helped them to understand and improve communication with Japanese trainers.  In
addition, among the first group of core members, production managers and assistant managers of each
department were sent first.  Their priority duties, after learning Japanese language, were to develop
training manuals concerning their department.  As they aware of the language barrier, these members
worked out translation these manuals into Thai language, in order to deploy them efficiently afterwards.
Taking one example of the power train assembly section,13 a Thai manager reported that he and anoth-
er engineer were in the first group sent to Japan.  They worked very hard in translating training course
written in Japanese into Thai language.  Support in forms of translators, each took care of 10 trainees,
and related English documents during this stage were of crucial in determining the success of this prepa-
ration.  What each Thai manager would do was to thoroughly consider how all required tasks would be
codified into Thai language so that their subordinates who came later could understand and be able to
perform these tasks efficiently.  He, as well as other managers, not only had to prepare for every single
station of engine assembly, but also to consider how to set a quality system in order to be best control
the actual production.  To be sure, Japanese trainers played a pivotal role in this process.14
Translated training manuals developed by each department were utilized according to the curriculum
to train employees who followed.  These documents were utilized in training basic and technical skills
necessary for each department.  Also, the on-the-job training (OJT) practice was extensively adopted to
make trainees understand exactly their responsible duties.  This is because specific (or tacit) skills of J-
firm staff are in nature hardly to articulate.  In addition, due to language problem, difficulties and ambi-
guities remained when insisting to rely only on codified documents like production manuals.  These
problems can be overcome when the communication takes place in a face-to-face manner.  Errors or
misunderstandings can be promptly corrected by personal feedback.
However, learning from such codified documents and using OJT practices might not lead to success-
ful skill formation.  By nature, learning is a mechanism necessary for transforming codified knowledge
to tacit knowledge of individuals or firms (McKelvey 1998), and the process takes time (Rosenberg
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1982).  A prudent way would be to assess the trainees' ability whether they sufficiently accumulated
expertise from the training or not.  According to the J-firm plan, all trainees would be evaluated to
acquire manufacturing skills step-by-step from being able to perform tasks under supervision of a trainer
(level 1), to be able to perform operation tasks by themselves and able to train new workers in their
work stations (level 2) and to be able to carry out production, make improvement, and train newly hired
workers (level 3), except those staff in class skilled operators and maintenance staff (see Table 5) were
required to obtain only "level 2".15
The assessment was done by requesting all trainees to articulate their understanding over aspects they
were trained.  This method was proved as an important impetus for completing the skill formation
process during this stage.  According to the interview results, Thai staff had praised high evaluation to
this scheme in that it was a good way to elicit their efforts in order to understand clearly what the verbal
or codified knowledge (training manuals) is, and how to perform their responsible tasks efficiently.
Following this criterion, Thai trainees reported that they became clearly understand the technical knowl-
edge of J-firm and being able to train lately employed staff.
About 75 percent of the core members as well as their trainers came to Thailand in September 1997,
when T-firm was preparing for launching first trial production in October.  All members, both Japanese
and Thai staff, worked together in this process, and, at the same time, they were responsible for training
new employees.  However, for Thai staff, only the core members participated in the preparation of first
and second trial production.  New employees took part in only from the pre-mass production and mass
production in May 1998.  Based on the schedule to export in December 1998, more employees were
recruited and trained.  Training new staff was accomplished mainly through the OJT basis.  After one or
two days of general training, about the company policies, new workers would be immediately trans-
ferred to the department they will later on work for.  Each department has its own training courses but
generally it was done exclusively through OJT.16
These findings, to a certain extent, shed some light on how costly the process of technology transfer
is, and what kinds of activities were promoted and by what mechanisms during the early stage of a new
project.  Though relying upon only one intra-firm project, results show how complex and multi dimen-
sional skills that this technology source must transfer to local employee if efficient mass production is
the ultimate goal.  Management of technology transfer is not an easy matter.  Success cannot be deter-
mined only at the beginning but also afterwards.  Roles of local people and Japanese staff in continuous
improvement are strongly important.  Hence, skills are continuously transferred, suggesting that technol-
ogy transfer process is never end.17
3.2 Inter-firm Technology Transfer Practice
3.2.1 Supplier technical development program 
To assure that all suppliers would be able to produce and supply parts in accordance with the project
schedule, a special team, called "supplier technical assistance" (STA) team, was set up to take care this
task.  The STA team was sent into Thailand to monitor and evaluate all suppliers manufacturing capabil-
ity.  After gathering information from factory visits, they could distinguish firms between capable and
probably incapable ones.  They had to keep close monitoring on suppliers that were new to J-firm, i.e.,
those that had no business relationship with before, because these firms might not be quite familiar with
specific manufacturing techniques of J-firm.  The STA master plan was concluded in September 1996,
and 33 core members were delegated for this purpose.  These members were appointed to support three
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major technical areas, which were forging/casting of power train and engine parts (13 people), trim parts
or interior parts (seven people) and stamping of body parts (13 people).  The length of period of supplier
technical assistance program was from January 1997 until January 1999.18
Not all members worked full time in Thailand for supporting locally based suppliers, however.  Some
worked as a support team while staying in Japan (denoted as 'Home service employees'; HSE), some
temporarily served direct support to suppliers (denoted as 'International service specialists'; ISS), and
some stayed long-term in Thailand to work with suppliers (denoted as 'International service employees';
ISE).  These three classifications were taken from J-firm criteria in which STA staff were divided into
three major types, according to geographic boundaries and duration of stay.  Job descriptions were as
follows:
1. HSE were those who stayed in Japan and were delegated to give support to T-firm project.  In other
word, HSE staff were standby to provide coordinates and to conclude what types of assistance or which
people would be sent to support T-firm suppliers.
2. ISS were staff who, at that time, were actually working full time for J-firm in Japan but were dele-
gated to give technical support to suppliers in Thailand.  They had a specific schedule to go back and
forth Thailand and Japan, and period of stay was short term, less than one year.
3. ISE were staff who were designated to provide technical assistance to suppliers in Thailand, as
same as ISS.  However, the period of stay in Thailand was longer than one year.
These staff were obliged to provide technical support to suppliers and to assure their production capa-
bility because these firms would supply parts incorporated into T-firm's export vehicles.  Totally 333
person-months were spent by STA staff, see Table 6, and assistance to suppliers in area of body parts
appeared to be highest in term of total person-months, followed by interior parts, and power train &
engine parts.
Table 6 Person-months of Japanese Staff Providing Technical Assistance to Suppliers in Thailand
This table shows that resources were allocated unevenly among three main categories; however, it
cannot tell what factors determining such allocation.  According to Samli (1985), a technology owner
will do transfer any technology if it 'wants to' and 'is capable' to do so.  Hence, in the situation that J-
firm, as a technology source, had deliberately set up STA team in a sense may imply that in which areas
of technology J-firm is specialized in.  Nevertheless, to be sure, it needs additional information especial-
ly on the receiver side.  The next subsection will discuss about roles of STA staff in assisting suppliers
to accomplish the preparation process.
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Average Total(person-months)ISE ISS HSE 
Type of staff
Technical aspects
5.7775362712Forging and casting parts
15105491838Trim parts
11.77153508221Stamping parts
 33313512771Total (person-months)
10.0922.59.775.07Average
Source: Calculated from Information of J-firm
Note: HSE, ISS and ISE see definition in text.
3.2.2 Inter-firm technical linkages 
As just shown, STA resources were concentrated in three specific technical aspects.  However, a
remaining question is what determines such concentration.  Taking a clue from Clark and Fujimoto
(1991), we may be able to answer this point.  In their comparative study of product development perfor-
mance among Japanese, USA, and European car makers, they observed that on average reliance of
Japanese assemblers on supplier involvement in the process of product development is as large as 70
percent of total purchased parts, indicating that only some fields that the assemblers have expertise.
According to their study, parts can be divided into three major types; namely supplier proprietary parts,
black box parts, and detail-controlled parts.  Japanese assemblers usually have capability to carry out all
development stages - from basic concept, draft drawing, prototype making, testing, approving and pro-
ducing only the last type - detail-controlled parts,19 while the first two types they rely on engineering
capability of suppliers.  Hence, when some detail-controlled parts were subcontracted out, the assem-
blers would be able to provide useful information to suppliers whenever necessary.  Therefore, in this
respect it makes clear then that J-firm can provide assistance in only some technical aspects that it actu-
ally has specialization.
3.2.3 STA's training strategies20
This part will describe the nature of STA's training plan.  It includes strategies of STA team, i.e.,
objectives of assistance, targeted suppliers, and support methods.  According to initial objectives of J-
firm, it required that suppliers would have to succeed in preparing for production in accordance with the
master schedule.  And, the main responsibility of STA team was to assure that all suppliers would be
able to supply parts for the launch of mass production of T-firm.  Hence, a fundamental role of STA
team was to monitor suppliers from timely schedule set in advance.  In other word, STA staff were
doing mainly "company visit".  But by doing so, they had to have conversation with suppliers' staff (i.e.,
a designated responsible team).  In the circumstance that suppliers had enough capability to prepare for
the order, either because of they were capable or they could get support from their foreign parent com-
pany, STA team would not have to exert any effort other than routinely visit, communicate with suppli-
ers' employees, and monitor the overall preparation processes.  However, for some suppliers that
revealed a possibility of delay, either because of lack of specific technological capabilities or absence of
a foreign partner to provide intra-firm support, the STA team had to directly create direct linkages.
In general, the STA team was to observe and monitor seven major steps of activities that each suppli-
er had to achieve step-by-step in order for the successful launch of mass production, which are: 1) man-
agement plan for overall project, 2) design of manufacturing process, 3) design and make tooling, 4)
design and make jigs and fixtures, 5) design and prepare for the production facility, 6) operating actual
mass production, and 7) control and improve productivity.  From the beginning until the mass produc-
tion, it had been the sole responsibility of STA team to monitor and ensure that all suppliers were able to
prepare all these processes.  In short, the main function of STA, if it was necessary to provide assistance,
was to fill in some technical capabilities that suppliers lacked.
In the case of direct support, STA staff reported that linkage creation was aimed at suppliers that were
lack of management and specific technical capabilities.  And technical support was initiated from the
first, management capability, to the last, being able to run and control quality in mass production.  The
project management is of crucial in determining the success in preparation, because inappropriate plan-
ning would lead to inefficient preparation of production process, equipment, facility, and so on, and then
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the overall project would suffer a setback from delay of few suppliers.  This is explaining why inter-firm
technical assistance proceeded from the first to the last step.  Direct efforts were accomplished by send-
ing a number of STA staff to work at the suppliers' factory for a certain period of time.  Support was
provided on the job basis.21 STA staff reported that in order to improve the management capability of
these deficient suppliers, they requested them to set up a team to be exclusively responsible for the T-
firm project.  This is the first step to make sure that all preparations and assistance they provided would
lead to a progress of the project.  After that, they assisted the suppliers to design the manufacturing
process, tooling, dies, and to prepare for the production facility such as set up the machine, confirm
quality standard, and to confirm the tested production lot until these suppliers were able to produce and
deliver good quality of parts to T-firm.
From the above explanation, it showed that deficient suppliers lacked well-systematical project man-
agement and some specific areas of technology required to produce J-firm parts.  Hence, it can be
argued that the priority task of the STA team was to establish a systematic management system neces-
sary for the preparation of their project.  In addition, due to time limitation, the most promising way of
skill promotion was through the OJT basis.  By employing OJT, STA staff could understand the actual
situation, and then could determine the source of problems that needed to be corrected.  Close communi-
cation with suppliers' staff could enhance the efficiency of skill transfer because face-to-face communi-
cation improved the quality of information flow.
My findings indicate that the main technical aspects that STA staff would be responsible for giving
support lie mostly in the first five steps explained above.  This is because of the fact that the sixth and
seventh steps, to operate actual mass production and to control and improve productivity, could not be
attained, at least by the schedule of T-firm, without direct support by J-firm.  The first five steps or capa-
bilities were prerequisites for successful mass production afterwards.  Once the mass production could
successfully start, technical support by STA staff would come to an end.  Then, suppliers take sole
responsibility to maintain and even to improve their production productivity by themselves later on, if
they wish to sustain the future business with T-firm.22
4. Conclusion
In this paper, I have discussed actual practices of technology transfer which took place in a recent
automobile project in Thailand.  By looking at one project, this study found that substantial amount of
efforts in promoting technological capabilities of local workers and suppliers were allocated.  Findings
of intra-and inter-firm practices support to Yamashita's "nine-stage of technology transfer" hypothesis,
explaining that technology will be transfer from lower to higher level, and the process never ends.  It
was discovered that the first four levels of technology, in Yamashita's "nine-stage" model, were likely to
be promoted simultaneously but an easier competence must be comprehended before the higher ones.  In
accumulation of such skills, OJT was an effective way at both intra- and inter-firm levels.  However, at
the intra-firm level, a criterion of evaluation employees' skills adopted by J-firm (explained in section
3.1) seems to have positive effect on the effectiveness of the skill formation, while to implement this
practice at the inter-firm one was beyond the authority of J-firm.
Regarding technology transfer at the inter-firm level, resources were unevenly distributed among sup-
pliers.  Based on my findings, I may conclude that inter-firm technology transfer is essential for
automakers but resources allocated for this purpose would concentrate in areas that the source has spe-
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cialization, and lower capability suppliers are likely to receive higher amount of these resources.  As the
actual STA technical assistance practices presented in 3.2.3, it was observed that technical problems lie
on two major areas, on the one hand, the specific technical requirement of the order itself, and on the
other hand, the systematic management of the production activity.  These two capabilities were not easy
to observe at the early stage of search and evaluation done by J-firm.  Hence, after specific relationship
has been created and problems were evident, technical assistance was necessary and method of impart-
ing skill to suppliers was to fill in technical aspects that suppliers were lacking and to create a more sys-
tematic preparation system.
Although inter-firm technical linkages can be regarded as an important means to improve technologi-
cal capability, suppliers need to be aware of the importance of their internal efforts aiming at improving
their technical capabilities.  As suggested by Cohen and Levinthal (1989), investment in enlarging tech-
nological capability will make learning from outside (such as inter-firm relationship) becomes more
likely and easier.  Without conscious resource allocation, not only are benefits deriving from inter-firm
relationship becoming irrelevant, but also internal improvements are hardly to achieve.  Although this
study focused only to a specific case, it can provide relatively new and inside information of the transfer
process.  More efforts should be done in this area by taking a larger number of firms or by studying
other industries.
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1 The industry is under restructuring process due to a drastic change in environment in recent years. See discussions
in Thamavit et al. (2000) and Poapongsakorn and Wangdee (2000).
2 In Yamashita (1991: 237)
3 This is a joint venture project between a Japanese (J-firm) and an American firm (A-firm).
4
"Intra-firm" technology transfer at the supplier level should also have significant influence on the nature and
degree of inter-firm technology transfer created by the J-firm, because it is responsibility of foreign suppliers in
building up their affiliates or partners in Thailand. In other word, this represents 'technological opportunity' to
acquire specific production knowledge for preparing the order. However, this study is not directly concerned with
this aspect, as it is beyond the scope of this study. Analysis on this aspect will be offered in another opportunity.
For explanation about the effect of foreign ownership on degree of technology transfer, see Ramachandran (1993)
and Urata and Kawai (1998).
5 In addition, I was able to interview with three automobile assemblers. These interviews were to observe and com-
pare general information about intra-firm technology transfer practice.
6 Including 100 percent and Japanese joint ventures that use Japanese technology.
7 There were only three non-Japanese firms replying the questionnaire, one is 100 percent owned by USA company,
one by a French company, and the other one is a joint venture between French and Thai company.
8 These inter-firm technical linkages were adopted from Hill (1985) and Kriengkrai (1997)
9 In fact, mass production for export started in November 1998 in order to export the first lot in December 1998 as
scheduled.
10 For Japanese staff, it includes time spent in training Thai workers in Japan and in Thailand during the period con-
cern. This idea was based on theoretical concepts and Ramachandran's (1993) in that resources expended on inter-
nationally transfer of human resource between the source and the recipient in order to bring the technology on
line.
11 Indeed, right after the project of T-firm was established, planning for construction, equipment installation, suppli-
er searching and training plan were set up in accordance with the overall project schedule. However, results pre-
sented here were based only on activities relating to training or skill formation.
12 At the end of period concerned, 80 Japanese staff remained working at T-firm.
13 Information was drawn from interview with a manager of T-firm, in October 5, 2000. Note that, he was a core
member in engine assemble department.
14 Interview with two managers, one from production engineering and the other from paint shop, in March 13 and
23, 2000, also reflected a similar view. They stated that Japanese trainers always asked them to perform almost all
related tasks, even a simple job like turning a screw of bolts and nuts. Underlying objectives were that, in their
opinion, the trainers would like them to understand the actual work environment their subordinates will perform.
And, they acknowledged that by doing in that manner, they could take all details of work into account when writ-
ing training and production manuals.
15 Skilled operators and maintenance staff usually have to engage in daily operation so at the early stage they were
required to achieve only "level 2". However, in a later stage,  they were encouraged to acquire "level 3", as an
incentive scheme of career path promotion. 
16 In some departments like trim and final and engine assembly, new operators would receive training their job
through the use of 'training jig' located next to the production line. Trainers - experienced operators, line leaders or
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supervisors - teach how to perform tasks. This process usually takes about one week or less, then new workers
will be transferred into the production line where OJT really takes place.
17 Interviews with managers of other three automakers also support this view. Interviews were done in September
and October 2000.
18 Note that, STA program was ended one month after the export schedule because J-firm wanted to assure that all
suppliers were capable to supply good quality parts. Thus, the time frame of analysis will extend to cover this
addition month as to include those resources spent by J-firm.
19 Of course, core technological parts like engine and transmission, and concept design would also be performed in-
house.
20 Information in this part is based on my interview with a leader and four core members of STA project in February
20, 2001, from 14:00 - 16:00, and on the results questionnaire survey and interview with some suppliers in
Thailand, during September and October 2000.
21 Interviews with STA staff and two corresponding suppliers that replied the questionnaires confirm this fact.
However, I would like to postpone detailed discussions about how J-firm accomplished technical support to these
two firms to the future occasion.
22 This is confirmed by information obtained from J-firm and interview with STA staff.
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